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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20080037-CA

BRADFORD DALE GETTLING,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Gettling's motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 42-35).
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.

1
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Bradford Gettling appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable James
R. Taylor, Fourth District Court, after the denial of his motion to suppress and his
conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, by a Sery guilty
plea.
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Bradford Dale Gettling was charged by criminal information filed on January 9,
2006 in Fourth District Court with possession or use a controlled substance in a drug free
zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and 5837a-5a respectively (R. 04-03). Bail was set at $10,000 cash on January 3, 2006 (R. 0201). On January 9, the Court appointed counsel for Gettling, advised Gettling of the
charges and penalties, and set a waiver hearing for January 11, 2006 (R. 11-09).
On January 11, the Court reset bail at $5,000 and at the request of counsel, set a
preliminary hearing for February 15, 2006 (R. 19-17). On January 23, 2006, Gettling
posted bail and signed a promise to appear at the preliminary hearing on February 15 (R.
21-20). At the preliminary hearing, the Court found probable cause and the charges were
bound over for trial (R. 24-22). The entry of plea was scheduled for March 15, 2006 (R.
22). On March 15, the Court granted a continuance at the request of defense counsel, and
the entry of plea was rescheduled for April 5, 2006 (R. 28-26). On April 5, defense
counsel requested time to file a motion, and the matter was continued to April 26, 2006
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 31-29), at which time, the Court gave defense counsel two weeks to file a motion to
suppress, and scheduled oral arguments for June 7, 2006, (R. 34-32). The parties later
stipulated to a continuance to July 5, 2006 (R. 46-44).
Defense counsel filed the motion to suppress with its supporting memorandum on
May 24, 2006 (R. 42-35). Counsel argued that the Level 2 detention of Gettling was not
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and that the evidence against
Gettling seized as a result of the encounter should therefore be suppressed (R. 41-36). In
its response, filed June 30, 2006, the State argued that Gettling did not have standing to
contest the search of the vehicle, and even if he did, the search of the vehicle was incident
to the arrest of the driver (R. 54-50). The State also argued that Gettling's detention was
only a Level 1 encounter because a traffic stop's Level 2 status only applies to the driver,
and not the passengers (R. 50-48). Defense counsel's reply, filed July 13, 2006, argued
that Gettling asserted his standing by arguing that his personal belongings were
unlawfully searched (R. 68-67). Counsel also argued that Gettling was detained, and not
free to leave, thus making his detention a Level 2 encounter (R. 64-63).
On July 5, defense counsel requested a continuance, and it was granted, with oral
arguments on the motion to suppress rescheduled for August 2, 2006 (R. 59-57). The
arguments were moved to August 9, on which day, the matter was set for further
proceeding on September 6, 2006 (R. 71-69).
On September 5, 2006, the Court denied Gettling's motion to suppress, holding
that, although Gettling had standing to challenge the search of his glasses case, he had no
standing to challenge the canine search of the vehicle (R. 75). The Court also held that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Gettling's furtive movements, coupled with the canine's interest in Gettling's glasses
case that remained in the car after Gettling exited, provided the officer with probable
cause to search Gettling's glasses case (R. 74). The next day, the case was set for trial on
November 1, 2006, with a final pretrial conference on October 26 (R. 85-83). On October
26, the State requested a continuance of the trial due to the unavailability of a witness,
and the trial was rescheduled for February 28,2007 (R. 94-92). Counsel was also
instructed to submit jury instructions, any motions in limine and voir dire one month
before trial (R. 94). On February 15, 2007, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to
prevent Deputy Radmall from testifying that Gettling invoked his right to remain silent
when he said, "Don't make me say it" (R. 98-95). The State's opposing memorandum,
filed May 1, 2007, argued that Gettling did not invoke his right to remain silent, and that
his words, taken in context, actually amounted to a confession (R. 188-13).
Defense counsel informed the Court on February 21 that he had been unable to
contact Gettling regarding his trial (R. 99). The Court struck the jury trial, (R. 99), and a
bench warrant was issued for Gettling's arrest on February 28, 2007, (R. 104-100). On
March 8, 2007, Gettling appeared in court, bail was set at $1,000 cash, bond or surety,
and a scheduling conference was scheduled for April 12, 2007 (R. 107-05). Gettling
posted bail on March 9 and signed a promise to appear (R. 109-08).
On April 12, a hearing on the motion in limine was scheduled for May 3, 2007 (R.
112-10). On May 3, the Court found that Gettling's comments should be suppressed (R.
121-19). On May 24, Gettling again requested a jury trial, and it was rescheduled for
October 9, 2007 (R. 124-22). On August 30, 2007, the State filed a Request to Submit for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Decision on Motion in Limine, asking the Court to rule on Gettling's motion in limine
(R. 132-31).
On October 9, 2007, Gettling waived his right to a jury trial, and pled guilty to a
third degree felony, possession of a controlled substance, for which the State agreed to
drop the misdemeanor paraphernalia charge (R. 175-73). The guilty plea was a Sery plea
that allows Gettling to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
against him (R. 197: 6). Sentencing was then scheduled for December 6, 2007 (R. 174).
Gettling was given a suspended sentence of up to five years in prison, placed on
probation for 36 months, and ordered to pay $9,275 fine, plus surcharge and interest (R.
179-76).
On December 7, Gettling was ordered to meet with a representative from UDCSA
for an assessment and orientation, and he signed a promise to appear for December 14,
2007 (R. 183-81). On December 14, Gettling was denied entry into drag court, and a
review on the regular criminal calendar was scheduled for December 20, 2007 (R. 18684). On December 20, the matter was referred to Adult Probation and Parole for an
updated report and an alternative recommendation for the Court, and sentencing was
scheduled for January 31, 2008 (R. 189-87). On January 7, 2008, a Notice of Appeal was
filed with the Court (R. 193-92).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Preliminary Hearing: February 15, 2006
On January 2, 2005, Deputy Shawn Radmall stopped a vehicle after observing the
vehicle making lane violations (R. 194: 5-6). Gettling was seated directly behind the
5
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driver, Steven Canals (R. 194: 6). After arresting Canals for outstanding warrants and a
suspended license, and placing Canals in the cruiser, Radmall informed the other
occupants of the vehicle that he was going to run his dog around the vehicle (R. 194: 6-7,
12). At that point, Radmall "noticed a little bit of furtive movement from" Gettling, (R.
194: 7), but had not located any drugs or suspected any of the vehicle's occupants of
using drugs, (R. 194: 12). Radmall later testified that he witnessed Gettling "doing
something along the seat," and that "his arms were down and he was leaning over
towards the passenger side" (R. 194:21-22). Radmall testified that he was concerned that
"there may be a weapon or something in the vehicle" (R. 194: 24). Because Radmall
noticed Gettling "doing some kind of movement" in the back seat, Radmall asked
Gettling and the other passenger, Amber Childs, to exit the vehicle and stand with the
female UVSC officer backing him up (R. 194: 7, 14, 26). At that point, Radmall said,
Gettling and Childs were not free to leave, and that he would have kept them there had
they tried to leave (R. 194: 14, 17).
After removing Gettling and Childs from the vehicle, Radmall ran his dog around
it (R. 194: 7, 13). The dog indicated in two areas: the top of the driver's window and the
door handle of the back passenger side door (R. 194: 7). At that point, Radmall told the
front passenger of the vehicle—who also owned the vehicle—that he was going to put the
dog in the car (R. 194: 7). The owner consented, noting that there should not be anything
in the car (R. 194: 8). The dog indicated under some luggage in the back seat, at which
point Radmall moved the luggage and found a glasses case containing methamphetamine

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in a small plastic baggy and paraphernalia inside of it (R. 194: 8-9). The substance tested
positive for methamphetamine at the State Crime Lab (R. 194: 9).
Canals and Childs both indicated that the glasses case did not belong to them, and
Gettling only said, "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say it." (R. 194: 10).
Gettling indicated that the luggage belonged to him, but only by asking to remove some
items from it (R. 194: 10, 19). Radmall arrested Gettling and did not read him his
Miranda rights (R. 194: 18). Radmall said the stop occurred within 1,000 feet of UVSC
(R. 194: 11).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the denial of Gettling's motion to suppress and vacate
his conditional guilty plea because the evidence against him was obtained through an
unreasonable search and seizure of his personal property.
Gettling was unreasonably seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because he was detained and not free to leave, even before probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity on Gettling's part arose. Gettling was detained as a result of
his furtive movements, made in the back seat of the car after the driver of the car had
been arrested on outstanding warrants and a suspended license. However, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that mere furtive movements do not give rise to reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been committed. Furthermore, Gettling's detention was an
unlawful extension of the scope of the initial traffic stop, which was fulfilled and
completed once the driver who committed the traffic offense had been arrested.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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Accordingly, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be excluded as
fruit of the poisonous tree.
ARGUMENT
I.

GETTLING WAS ILLEGALLY DETAINED, AND THE
SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY
WAS ILLEGAL

The trial court erred in denying Gettling's motion to suppress because Gettling
was illegally detained and his personal possessions illegally searched. Passengers in a
stopped vehicle may not have standing to contest a subsequent search of the vehicle when
they have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. State v. DeAlo, 748
P.2d 194, 197 (Ut. App. 1987). However, passengers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal possessions, and can therefore challenge the legality of searches
of their possessions that occur without their consent. See State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT
App 256, % 20, 76 P.3d 178. Additionally, police must have an articulable, reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to detain someone, and the detention can only be long
enough to investigate the specific suspicion, while reasonably related to the scope of the
stop. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994).
Deputy Radmall had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gettling was
engaged, or was about to engage in any criminal activity, including the use or possession
of drugs (R. 194: 12). Absent other incriminating circumstances, the furtive movements
cited by Radmall as the reason for removing Gettling from the car do not give rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Schlosser, 11J4 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah
1989). Radmall should have allowed Gettling to leave with all of his possessions, rather
8
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than detain him prior to the free air canine sniff of the vehicle because the purpose of the
stop was to investigate the driver, and nothing further pointed to Gettling being engaged
in criminal activity.
The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, dictates that evidence seized by and through an illegal search
and seizure must be suppressed and not admitted for the court's consideration. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Accordingly, the seizure of Gettling violated his Fourth
Amendment rights, and the evidence seized as a result of the illegal search and seizure
should be suppressed. Gettling respectfully requests this Court to reverse the denial of his
motion to suppress and vacate his conditional guilty plea.
A. Police lacked the required reasonable suspicion to escalate the
encounter with Gettling to a level two encounter.
Gettling's detention was a level two encounter with police, and it was and illegal
seizure because Deputy Radmall lacked the requisite probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that Gettling was engaged in any criminal activity. A level two encounter is an
"investigative detention" that may be initiated by an officer "when specific and
articulable facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person
has or is committing a crime." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, «[[ 35, 63 P.3d 650 (internal
quotes omitted). Furthermore, "[i]f a reasonable person would not believe he or she is
free to leave . . . the encounter remains an investigatory detention," or level two
encounter. Id. at ^ 39.

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Hansen, police pulled over a driver for traffic violations, but, without
suspecting any further illegal activity, questioned the driver about the presence of drugs,
alcohol or weapons in the vehicle, and asked to search the vehicle. Id. at ^ 32. The Court
held that it was reasonable under the circumstances for the driver to believe that he was
not free to leave. Id. at f 45. The Court also noted the "threatening presence of more than
one officer" as another indication that the driver was not free to leave. Id. at 144.
Here, Deputy Radmall testified that he had no reason to believe that the driver or
anyone else in the vehicle was using drugs (R. 194: 12). Thus, Gettling should have been
free to leave. However, before running his dog around the vehicle, Radmall had Gettling
get out of the vehicle and stay with another officer who was backing up Radmall, and
Radmall never told Gettling he was free to leave (R. 194: 13-14). Radmall also testified
that, although he had not told Gettling he had to stay, he "considered he was detained"
(R. 194: 17).
Just like Hansen, when Gettling was asked to exit the vehicle and stand in the
"threatening presence" of another officer, it would have been unreasonable for him to
believe he was free to leave. In fact, Radmall testified that he "probably" would have
kept Gettling there if he tried to walk away (R. 194: 17). Clearly, Gettling was detained
and not free to leave before any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arose.
The trial court denied Gettling's motion to suppress because, in its view, the dog's
indication on Gettling's personal property, coupled with Gettling's furtive movements,
gave Radmall "the requisite probable cause to search the glasses case" (R. 74). However,
the "requisite probable cause" found by the trial court clearly did not arise until after
10
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Gettling was detained, before the dog sniffed around the outside vehicle (R. 194: 7, 13).
Police had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain Gettling in the first place.
This Court has previously reversed a denial of a motion to suppress in nearly
identical circumstances as the present case because "the desire to check the vehicle for
controlled substances did not require the presence of the passengers." State v. Baker,
2008 UT App. 1154 13, 182 P.3d 935. In Baker, this Court held that the "continued
detention" of a passenger was "impermissible" while a K-9 unit arrived and searched the
vehicle in which he was riding because "the officers needed some reasonable articulable
suspicion to lawfully detain Baker and the other passengers while awaiting the K-9 unit's
arrival." Id.
In the present case, the Court could easily substitute Gettling's name for Baker's
in the quotes immediately preceding this sentence. Gettling's continued detention was
impermissible while the K-9 unit ran around the vehicle because police needed "some
reasonable articulable suspicion" to detain Gettling. However, police offered no
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Gettling had or was about to commit a crime.
Therefore, Gettling was impermissibly detained.
B. Gettling's furtive movements do not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, thereby making Gettling's
detention an illegal seizure.
Gettling's furtive movements in the back of the vehicle do not create a reasonable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing, thus negating police's stated reason for removing
Gettling from the car and detaining him. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[m]ere

11
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furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable
suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Schlosser, 114 P.2d at 1137.
In Schlosser, police observed "a passenger in the vehicle, bending forward, acting
fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and turning back to look at the officer." Id. at
1133. The Court held that, without more, the passenger's movements did not "show a
reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur." Id. at
1138. The Court said that the passenger
may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have been
preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on
the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away
food and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake
or doing a host of other innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic
stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and
excited and to turn to look at an approaching police officer.
Id
Radmall testified that after he had arrested the driver and told Gettling and the
other passenger that he was going to run his dog around the vehicle, he "noticed a little
bit of furtive movement from . . . Gettling" (R. 194: 7). He said that Gettling's "arms
were down and he was leaning over towards the passenger side (R. 194: 22). Like
Schlosser, Gettling could have been doing a "host of other innocuous things" when he
leaned over toward the passenger side of the vehicle. Radmall testified that it was "due to
the furtive movement" that he had Gettling get out of the vehicle and stand with the other
officer on scene (R. 194: 22). Thus, Gettling was detained and not free to leave, merely
because of his furtive movements in the vehicle—furtive movements that by law do not
"give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity." Because a person
12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot be detained without that reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
Hansen, 63 P.3d at 661, Gettling's detention was an unreasonable and illegal seizure.
C. The seizure of Gettling and the subsequent search of his personal
property was not reasonably related to the scope of the traffic
stop.
As Gettling was seized after the driver of the vehicle in which he was riding was
pulled over for traffic violations and subsequently arrested on outstanding warrants, and
before any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on his part arose, the seizure was not
reasonably related to the scope of the initial traffic stop. Therefore, Gettling was illegally
detained and the evidence against him should have been and should now be suppressed.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted a two-part test to determine the Constitutional
reasonableness of a search or seizure: "(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its
inception? and (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 113132.
In Bissegger, this Court held that the initial traffic stop of a vehicle with expired
license plates was justified because driving with expired registration was a traffic offense
committed in the presence of an officer. 2003 UT App 256 at ^ 17. Once the officer
verified the driver's license and registration and checked for warrants, "the purpose for
the initial traffic stop was concluded." Id at If 18. However, this Court held that
extending the driver's detention for purposes of a field sobriety test was proper because
the odor of alcohol gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. But when
the driver passed the field sobriety test, "any further detention was unlawful." Id. at ^j 20.
13
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Furthermore, the search of the car that yielded contraband in the passenger's closed lip
balm container exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop, and this Court reversed the
denial of the passenger's motion to suppress. Id. at ]f 21.
Like Bissegger, the initial stop of the vehicle in which Gettling was a passenger
was proper. The warrants check on the driver was also proper because "running a
warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond
that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration and to issue a
citation." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. However, like Bissegger, the scope of the traffic stop
was fulfilled once the driver—who committed the traffic violation—was arrested,
especially because Radmall had no reason to believe that anyone in the vehicle was using
drugs. Just as the evidence seized from the passenger's lip balm container was suppressed
in Bissegger because it was seized as a result of a search that improperly extended the
scope of the initial detention, so too was Gettling's glasses case searched improperly. The
scope of the traffic stop was fulfilled and its purpose concluded once the driver of the
vehicle in which Gettling was riding was arrested. Accordingly, Gettling's continued
detention was an improper and unreasonable extension of the scope of the initial traffic
stop because police never had a reasonable suspicion that Gettling had or was about to
commit a crime, before or during the traffic stop. Therefore, all evidence obtained as a
result of this illegal detention and search should be suppressed.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse
the denial of his motion to suppress and vacate his conditional Sery plea, and remand this
case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of August, 2008.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 11th day of August, 2008.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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FILED
Fourth Jucisaai District Court
of Utah County, Stale of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
RULING & ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 061400084

BRADFORD DALE GETTLING,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court
having carefully considered and reviewed thefilein this matter, the memoranda submitted by the
parties, having heard oral arguments, reviewed the submitted memoranda, and good cause
appearing therefore, the Court enters the following Ruling,

FINDINGS OF FACT & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. On January 2,2006, Deputy Shawn Radmall of the Utah County Sheriff s Office was on
patrol on Geneva Road in Provo when he observed a vehicle crossing left of center. The
1
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Officer suspected a possible D\ JI aadfollov ed the vehicle along Geneva Road.into Orem
and onto 1300 South.

of the vehicle was a Mr, Steven Canals. The officer observed two passengers in the car.
The passenger in the front passenger se.*\ . <

i i .

I

<r

of the vehicle. The passenger seated directly behind the di^ cr was :he \ jelen i: \
Bradford Dale Gettling ("Mr.. Getting ).
-•eputy Radmall ran a license and warrant check on the driver Afterdiscovering that the
driver had outstanding warrants and a suspended IKCI^C,. >ej>ut> r^iUi ,iii SU C W:

^eput y Radmall then questioned the two passengers of the stopped vehicle to determine
uA

*•-.. , did not.

• >ey>i.t\ Radmall mibrmed the passengers that he was going 'o pe^fbrm a canine search of
I lie s el nek1 iiJLiduH <o iln." i|«ivei "s mi'sl. Vroidjim I MM* nlfi'Vi tin barl i,prit
passenger, Mr. Gettling appeared to be nervous at this statement.
\n liepuly Radmall plarnl \\w d"

"

iL

'i^puly' i |»U>IIMT \T.hu:li\ he obserynl \\h il liu

believed were furtive iiiovements h\ Mi, Gettling in the backseat of the stopped vehicle.
7

ueputy Riidiimll minimal Mi " KMIIIII) IIKI !\Is (Tunis liwn In1 miondird to inn hi^ dug -
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)

around the vehicle in order to perform afreeair search of the vehicle. Ms. Childs
advised him that she was fine with the exterior search of the vehicle. Deputy Radmall
asked Mr. Gettling and Ms. Childs to exit the vehicle while he performed a canine search
of the exterior of the vehicle. After performing a brief Terry Frisk, he asked them to
stand by a backup officerfromUtah Valley State College ("UVSC"). Deputy Radmall
subjectively believed, but did not express his belief to the two passengers that they were
notfreeto leave.
8. During the canine search, Deputy Radmall's canine indicated positive for the presence of
narcotics in the vehicle on the passenger's side rear door handle.
9. Deputy Radmall informed thefrontseat passenger and owner of the car, Amber Childs of
the dog's positive indications. Ms. Childs agreed to his request that the dog search the
interior of the vehicle. Ms. Childs stated that she did not believe that any drugs were in
her car.
10. Once inside the car, the dog indicated positive for the presence of narcotics somewhere
in the backseat of the car. Deputy Radmall removed luggagefromthe backseat to expose
a hard glasses case that was underneath the luggage. Upon opening the case, Deputy
Radmall discovered drug paraphernalia (a spoon, some straws, a glass pipe) and
methamphetamine inside.

3
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^

^

i

t

Side of Ms findings. Ms. Childs

p[

:md Mi ' \ i : u k h>:h dunicii >unmg the diugs and reined paraphernalia.
1 ]l

Aitci Ms "i hiMn ikiiiLiI' ewnership \h i idling IIM \\A\ il I 'epnh R i iinall, " nirliM1 1 Iis
head and said: "Don't make me tell you. Don't make me say it,"

l i Mr. i . .......

4 tested IIMI I tepniy W ftcinialI relneve < vei jl iieni, fun ilu> luggage mil

give th - , • H Vk CMUK \ r . Gettilng advised the officer that he was transient and "that
was ail ;

...:.

14. Mr. Gettling filed his Motion to Suppress on May 24, 2006.
1

^ The State filed its Response on J «r.L

< *'fi

iu. A he Defendant filed Ms Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on J illy
13, 2006.
1 ; ' rhe Cou i:t heai d arguments on the matter on August 93 2006.

'

•

• '

'•

•

'

• • • • • • •

•

..

•

I

I

^

.

•

?LN M ,YSIS & RULING
'The issues bHbre fhr (' 'oinl ,HT f 11 mines <i passenger in a vehicle have standing to assert
a claini that his Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure has been violated; (2) if a
passengei dm11. Ibnu: sUindmi1, is In milinvl"111' ""^'^ned duniip tin1 seairh; anil (3) mil evidence
discovered during the search he suppressed

['he I defendant asks the Court to suppress the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

]' O

evidence of Methamphetammes and Drug Paraphernalia on the basis that Deputy Radmall
unlawfully extended the scope of the Defendant's detention. Specifically, the Defendant argues
that Deputy Radmall had completed his traffic stop, arrested the driver of the vehicle on a
warrants check, returned to the vehicle without suspicion of criminal activity, and asked
Defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, to exit the vehicle while Deputy Radmall improperly ran a
canine unit around the vehicle. The Defendant argues that any evidence obtained from the
canine search is a result of an illegal detention of Defendant and should be suppressed.

A. Standing
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
CONST, AMEND. IV. Before

asserting a violation of Fourth Amendment rights, a

defendant must first establish that he has standing in item of place searched. State v.
Bisseger, 76 P.3d 178,181 (Utah Ct App. 2003)(overruled on other grounds). It is
important to note that the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment "are personal in
nature and may not be vicariously asserted." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,133-34
(1978); Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 181; State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1006 (1993). A defendant
challenging the validity of a search must establish that he possessed a reasonable
"legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded space." Bisseger, 76 P.3d at 181
5
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(internal citations omitted)

\ defendant bears the bi lrden of proving his standing. Scott,

860P.2datl007.
In determining whdliti a nick inhhl Lis i legilimalf < -.pet liilioii uf pnv,it v in the
area and belongings searched, the Court employs a two-part test, tiisseger, 76 ]•' 3d at
181. Kiist, thedeieiiJa;;; u.^i _

.•

L

s

•• atinnir

•• .

the searched area." Id- *iiatc Y, Sepulveda 842 P.2d ^13. 915 (Utaa Ct. App
Scott, 860 P.2d at 1* o'

\» •;. t -

../. .i.~-i

.*

'

992 >.

' ^

cxpoclaticMi was objectively reasonable . . . -and] whether society is willing to recognize
the individuals expectation of privarva? legitimate
"K

••

.a (internal citahons and

r- rentier in the vehicle does not having standing 1;-

assert a l-ourth Amendment cl;nin UM^ m passenger has an ownership interest m :, J
v^u

7

i-

tisseger. ""6 p.jd at 181-82. Scott 860 P.2d at

1007 A. passenger, however, who has an ownership interest in personal property seized
liiHii llu u i , sin It as ii i Insnl ilnn Miniliii In ;i put'i" i luij>f.Mgc\ may have standing in
that individual item. See Bisseger, 76 P..3d,, at 182.
InBisbcuo

•< •< i

'

•'

r

-uaLiou,

The office]" at?ked the passenger, who had * * • *\* nerslnp inleres; n. me chicle, to get nut
\A tlii.! car. hi

.

*

: - *

small opaque lip-balm container. Id. As the officer searched, the car, he discovered the
6
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lip-balm container. Id. at 180-81. The officer knew that the container belonged to the
passenger and had no individualized probable cause as to the container. Id.
Nevertheless, the officer opened the container without first obtaining permissionfromthe
passenger and found methamphetamine inside. Id. In reviewing the passenger's motion
to suppress, the Court of Appeals analogized the lip-balm container to a purse, shoulder
bag, jacket, or shopping bag and determined that such items are "closed containers] that
keep[] the owner's personal things hiddenfrompublic view" and "[bjecause [the
defendant] placed private things in a closed opaque container, [the defendant] had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the container.5' Id at 182. Therefore,
while passengers in a vehicle do not have standing to object to a search of the vehicle
itself, the passengers will have standing to challenge the search and seizure of their
personal property found within the vehicle. Id. A passenger will not have standing if it
can be shown that they abandoned the property. State v. Rviihart 125 P.3d 938 (Utah
2005).
Applying Bisseger to the instant case, the Courtfindsthat the Defendant has
standing as to the search of the hard glasses case found as a result of the canine search of
the vehicle. The officer discovered the glasses case underneath luggage on the backseat
of the vehicle next to where the Defendant was sitting. Officer Radmall opened the case
and searched it prior to determining ownership of the case. Similar to the lip-balm
7
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container found in Bisseger, the glasses case was a personal contaner. ' wa> closed
opaque. At the point of discovery,

-^mld not ascertain

U^WII.LCI

IK\;

case and made no attempt to detennine ownership prior to opening it

r

-IIKI

• .• •

i

his Co^rt i^ids

that similar to a purse Jacket, or lip-balm, a glasses case is a personal j vm n. v>:da> %
person would have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Although the Defendant has standing as to contest the search o: die glasses case,,
the Defendant does not have standing as to the canine searches of die vehicle. ' I he
Defendant did not have or claim any ownership interest in the vehicle, Without any such
inter'. *

u K -,-

• .• - -

i.-

-I . :•• ^

NCM-JS

search was .uini ;r< niu;iev: i<* I lie arrest ot the drive! .nc Uic perirnssi* ntheoiliccr
ol:r - -v' *- •• . <

*:- ^

".

;ILK-

B. Search & Seizui e

: •

'

•

* ' >

. .

As standing has been esiaoiism

< t

by Defendant in his Motion to Supp-cs^ ihe Deter.j.iht .wrts '\ a! e idence ^htain^ii m
the searcji,.: uie glasses case s;

be suppressed

* u. t

- i

passenger in was unlawfully searched, (2) the officer improperly required Defendant to

8
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vacate the vehicle, and (3) that the subsequent detainment of the Defendant was
unlawfully extended due to the unlawful search of the vehicle.
As noted above, the Court has found that Defendant does not have standing to
contest the search of the vehicle. Therefore, any argument that evidence should be
suppressed because of an unlawful search of the vehicle is inapplicable to the instant
case. Consequently, because the search of the vehicle is not in question, any evidence
obtained as a result of the vehicle's search will not be suppressed unless there are other
independent grounds requiring their suppression.
As to the search of the glasses case, the Court finds that Deputy Radmall had the
requisite probable cause to search the glasses case. When a canine search is performed, a
positive indication by a drug-sniffing canine provides the requisite probable cause to
search a container. State v. Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Deputy
Radmall's canine clearly indicated on the glasses case. This indication, along with the
Deputy's previous observations of Defendant's furtive actions when the Defendant was
still in the backseat of the car, provided the Deputy with the requisite probable cause to
search the glasses case.
A claim of an unlawfully extended detainment of the Defendant, a passenger, has
no bearing on the lawfulness of the search of the car and the subsequent search of the
glasses case. In State v. Shepard, the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out that "[t]he
9
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United States Supreme Cour!

•* - *XT^ asking a passenger to exit the car •

was no* illegal." State v. Shcpard. !>;-. . .*. o.

•/

u.

'.

- -

lfcqyjam. y.

Wilson : i : .J.S. 4U8 (1997),. An officer does not need to observe anj • 'ireaier *\t>
beha\ ior from the vehicle's passengers before directing a passenger ou. J1 ir.c v.\&. Id,
-

ir+4|'iia w as a nas^eiuier *n the vehicle, He did not h ave

;; dri\ei hccise or. Ins person, was n n me < vvner of the vehicle, and ha dno legal ability
• ' :-.

;,;j

•- !

4

;

tliai the officer's request that the

Defendant leave the veliiclc in ordc: to facilitate a canine search on the car was lawful
..:

>'-

•

* •>•

onlawfullv detained ah a result of the search of the vehicle

-*

^ P

v

-

-\

arthei, at ne tn;jt 'he

Ueputj searched Hie glasses case, Hie I -Vkiidanl win1, nut in possession nf llitj ci^e .'mil
had not claimed ownership to the case, Mr, Gettling cannot claim he was unlawfully
detained as a result ot an uiilawJul scaidi ol eilliei llu vclni'lle fir Ihc gliisses r.ii .1 I li
Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress,
Because the status of the Defenuaiu uunng :e. -c . •

i u: .

:,,»» s

case is not relevant, the court does not make a finding as to whether the Defendant was
unlawfully detained,.

*\r
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ORDER
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth therein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.

^JSsffiL
is
Signed this

—'

d
day of September, 2006
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